Experimenting with decentralized energy governance in China:The case of New Energy Demonstration City Program by Wu, Jing et al.
 
 
 University of Groningen
Experimenting with decentralized energy governance in China
Wu, Jing; Zuidema, Christian; Gugerell, Katharina
Published in:
Journal of Cleaner Production
DOI:
10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.04.123
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Final author's version (accepted by publisher, after peer review)
Publication date:
2018
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Wu, J., Zuidema, C., & Gugerell, K. (2018). Experimenting with decentralized energy governance in China:
The case of New Energy Demonstration City Program. Journal of Cleaner Production, 189, 830-838.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.04.123
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 27-12-2020
Accepted Manuscript
Experimenting with decentralized energy governance in China: The case of New 
Energy Demonstration City Program




To appear in: Journal of Cleaner Production
Received Date: 14 July 2017
Revised Date: 05 April 2018
Accepted Date: 14 April 2018
Please cite this article as: Jing Wu, Christian Zuidema, Katharina Gugerell, Experimenting with 
decentralized energy governance in China: The case of New Energy Demonstration City Program, 
 (2018), doi: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.04.123Journal of Cleaner Production
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to 
our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo 
copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. 
Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the 
content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1
Experimenting with decentralized energy governance in China: 
The case of New Energy Demonstration City Program
Jing Wua,1Christian Zuidemaa, Katharina Gugerella
a Department of Spatial Planning and Environment, Faculty of Spatial Sciences, University of Groningen, Landleven 1, 9747AD 
Groningen, The Netherlands
KEY WORDS 
Governance Experimentation; New Energy Demonstration City Program; Energy Transition; 
China
ABSTRACT   
A transition from a fossil fuel based energy system to a more sustainable energy system based 
more on renewables has been of increasing concern worldwide over the past decade. Such a 
transition has considerable spatial-physical and socioeconomic implications, suggesting area-
based perspectives and related decentralized governance approaches as being crucial to 
complement, or partly replace, traditional centralized governance approaches. In response to 
implementation barriers to energy policies, China has also begun to experiment with more 
decentralized governance structures through the launch of national pilot programs. In the 
meantime, international studies have disputed the widely assumed benefits of decentralized 
approaches. Scholars have especially cautioned that decentralization needs to be informed 
about the degree to which local stakeholders are willing and able to cope with newly acquired 
responsibilities or tasks. This research investigates the willingness and ability of Chinese local 
authorities to perform tasks indicated in the pilot program ‘New Energy Demonstration City 
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(NEDC)’. This research, involving four case study cities and over 20 expert interviews, noted 
only modest willingness and ability. Local performance is constrained by inadequate local 
technical and managerial ability and a possible weak profile of renewable energy compared to 
other local priorities, and a limited local scope of influence over energy transition-related 
challenges as well decreased local willingness and ability. This research concludes that 
decentralization under energy policies should take place within a context of central support 
and stimuli, highlighting the importance of national policies and regulations to enable and 
activate local authorities and stakeholders in pursuing energy transition policies.
1. Introduction  
Energy transition has become a global political issue of some urgency and has attracted 
academic interest as a research subject in the fields of urban and environmental studies 
(Wassermann et al., 2015). An energy transition can be understood as a transformation of an 
energy system based on fossil fuels to one that is more efficient and is based on renewables. 
Such a transition is a highly dynamic, complex and multi-dimensional process in which one 
dominant socio-technical system transforms into another (Loorbach, 2007; Rotmans et al., 
2001). This complex process is “not just a technological issue, but necessarily involves 
changes across the whole of a society” (Andrews-Speed, 2012, p. 63). More specifically, 
energy transition is a complex process that cannot be understood within isolated policy 
sectors. A multitude of interrelated processes are involved, including technological 
innovations, economic interests, institutions, rules, behaviors, etc. (Verbong and Loorbach, 
2012). Hence, an energy transition involves a multitude of societal and market parties, each 
claiming their place in the governance process. In the meantime, these stakeholders have their 
own interests, aims, perceptions, and preferences which are interrelated and may conflict with 
one another (Droege, 2011). Moreover, policy development and implementation manifest 
themselves differently in different places due to unique local circumstances and interests 
(Smil, 2008). Therefore, relying on a centralized mode of governing is problematic for 
managing energy systems as this approach has difficulty in responding to interrelations 
between energy systems and their physical and socioeconomic contexts in their unique local 
setting (de Boer and Zuidema, 2016). As a result, authors, such as de Boer and Zuidema 
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(2015), have highlighted the necessity of area-based approaches to complement existing 
energy transition policies. In addition, authors, such as Kemp (2010) and van der Schoor and 
Scholtens (2015), have suggested that the planning and governance of energy transitions 
needs to embrace and foster the roles that local government, entrepreneurs and citizens can 
play. 
Arguments that support area-based planning approaches are closely linked to policy 
arguments that support decentralization (Zuidema, 2016) which aim to shift power and 
responsibility from a national to a local level (De Vries, 2000). Proponents of decentralization 
have argued that it can increase government responsiveness and effectiveness to local (and 
more complex societal) issues (Faguet, 2012), while also enabling more productive policy 
delivery, due to their being a greater knowledge of local circumstances (i.e. needs, potentials 
and problems) (de Roo et al., 2012). As such, local authorities are thought to be better placed 
to balance various local interests, power and resources among local actors, market parties, and 
social organizations (Rumbach, 2016). These widely assumed benefits have placed 
decentralized approaches at the center stage of policy experiments over the recent decades 
(e.g., Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Bulkeley and Castan Broto, 2013; Zuidema, 2016). 
However, decentralization can also have negative consequences (e.g., Flynn, 2000; 
Brinkerhoff and Azfar, 2010), for example, limited equity between local governments 
promoting undesirable competition (De Vries, 2000), free rider problems and increased local 
corruption (Rees and Hossain, 2010). Meanwhile, authors, for example Smoke (2015), have 
stated that decentralization can be risky, as decentralized units do not necessarily have the 
capacity and incentives to act as the theory predicts. As Zuidema and de Roo (2015, p.65) 
argued, “decentralization means that the outcomes of governance become increasingly 
dependent on local performance and therefore, of the available local willingness and ability to 
perform decentralized tasks and responsibilities.” Benefits of area-based approaches and a 
more decentralized governance approach to energy transitions cannot simply be assumed, but 
need careful studying. This is exactly what this article will do, by targeting one of the most 
crucial countries in which a global energy transition needs to take place: China.
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China is committed to an energy transition towards a low-carbon economy by setting up 
various policies and targets. Implementation barriers (e.g., Wu et al., 2017) and the 
expectation of boosting local energy transition have spurred China to experiment with local 
energy policies with pilot projects, such as Eco-City and Low-Carbon City (18th CCCPC, 
2013). These national pilot projects allow local authorities to develop and implement policies 
according to their specific local circumstances to bring collaborating and competing 
stakeholders together in a local bargaining network (Li and de Jong, 2017). Although not a 
replacement for existing central governmental policies and targets, these pilot projects are 
intended to stimulate local policy formulation. As such, they represent an institutional attempt 
to experiment with more decentralized practices within the Chinese centralized planning 
system. Inspired by the aforementioned doubts about decentralization, this article will 
investigate whether Chinese local authorities have the willingness and ability to develop and 
implement local energy policies.
Whilst contributing to our knowledge of the current development practices of Chinese energy 
policies, this article aims also to contribute to a wider debate on energy transitions and 
decentralized area-based working. Recent studies convincingly have showed the importance 
of studying energy transitions within their localized spatial contexts (de Waal and Stremke, 
2014; Nadaï and van der Horst, 2010; Stoeglehner et al., 2011; Stremke, 2012; Zuidema and 
de Boer, 2017). The process and practices of the energy transition vary spatially due to the 
variety of stakeholders involved and the specific local circumstances (Faller, 2016). However, 
these studies have not explicitly addressed the role of more decentralized energy policies, and 
therefore this article is contributing to relate energy transitions with decentralization in energy 
governance. Also, in China, the physical and socio-economic dependence of sustainable 
energy systems on the local landscape is barely even considered. If studies do address the 
local level, they have remained focused on the implementation of national policies in a local 
realm (e.g., Li et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2014; Yang and Li, 2013). Some studies have explicitly 
raised doubts about local performance (e.g., Khanna et al., 2014; Yu, 2014; Zhang et al., 
2010). Nevertheless, these studies have not discussed precisely why local performance is 
poor, and they have hardly ever reflected on the possible role of the Chinese decentralized 
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project-based approach (e.g., de Jong et al., 2016). As China works to engage more local 
energy policy development, this is not just an interesting empirical context for analyzing local 
willingness and ability, but is also relevant to develop Chinese energy policy. Hence, this 
article focuses on uncovering the potentials and pitfalls in relation to local willingness and 
ability to perform the most recent nationwide pilot program: ‘New Energy Demonstration 
City (NEDC)’. 
Arguments for and against decentralization are discussed in Section 2 to inform the analytical 
lens used for the empirical study. Section 3 explains the methodology in which introduces the 
empirical context of the NEDC program and the cities and is where this article studies its 
impact in practice. Section 4 discusses the results, noting the modest degree of willingness 
and ability to develop and implement energy policies at the local level. The main conclusions 
are presented in Section 5, where this article discusses the role of central policies and 
incentives for stimulating and supporting local willingness and ability in the realm of energy 
governance.
2. Decentralization in energy governance  
An energy system can be viewed as “a complex web of interrelated actors and networks, in 
physical, social, economic and institutional senses” (de Boer and Zuidema, 2016, p.174). 
Transforming such a system, thus, involves not only considerable physical and socio-
economic changes, but also a multitude of actors and parties with different interests (Verbong 
and Loorbach, 2012). Relying only on centralized governance modes dictated by 
governmental decisions and regulations has been viewed as being insufficient (e.g., Pierre and 
Peters, 2000; Wu et al., 2017). Instead, an energy transition requires a process of governance 
in which governments, markets and civil society are all involved across various levels and 
sectors (Loorbach, 2010).
Presently, Chinese energy policies rely on a centralized approach based on regulatory 
instruments. This is not without its problems, including serious implementation deficiencies at 
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a local level (e.g., Wu et al., 2017). Inspired by a need to rethink the current hierarchal policy 
system (e.g., Gilley, 2012), the Chinese central government have chosen to experiment with 
more decentralized approaches in pilot programs, such as the NEDC. The result is an increase 
in the inclusion of the local level in developing energy policies; this with the hope of boosting 
local policy development and area-based solutions. Scholars have pointed out that 
decentralization can produce more balanced, inclusive and tailor-made policy solutions that 
are able to respond effectively to interrelated and complex issues (e.g., De Vries, 2000; 
Mosley, 2009). Nevertheless, the actual outcomes of decentralization depend on local policy 
performance (e.g., De Vries, 2000; Werlin, 1992). As Zuidema (2016) suggested, local 
performance depends on local willingness and ability to take on decentralized tasks. Others 
have added to this that local willingness and ability cannot simply be assumed (e.g., De Vries, 
2000; Flynn, 2000; Prud’homme, 1995). Instead, as, for example, Zuidema (2016) states, 
there are several key constraints to local willingness and ability (also Fleurke and Hulst, 
2006). Based on these findings, this article uses the concepts of ‘willingness’ and ‘ability’ to 
discuss the impact of the NEDC.
Understanding willingness
Although willingness seems to be a rather straightforward notion, there are at least two crucial 
nuances that need to be considered when analyzing willingness at an organizational level. The 
first nuance is drawn from motivation-crowding theory and highlights the difference between 
willingness based on intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation (Rode et al., 2015; Ryan and Deci, 
2000). Intrinsic motivation refers to doing an activity when driven primarily by self-interest 
or personal conviction (Ritz, 2015). Extrinsic motivation is when activities are driven by 
external pressure or incentives and are typically done for instrumental value, such as “in order 
to attain a separable outcome, be it of a material or monetary nature or related to perceived 
benefits of a non-material kind” (Rode et al., 2015, p.270). The difference between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation is quite relevant in the case of decentralization, as decreasing top-
down pressure on local units will imply willingness to become increasingly dependent on 
intrinsic motivation (compare Bowles, 2008; Zuidema, 2016). 
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Accepting that motivation-crowding theory focuses largely on individuals fuels the second 
nuance. This does not imply that the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is 
irrelevant for organizational units, such as city governments (e.g., Ritz et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge that groups function differently from individuals. 
Organizational willingness might be influenced by existing organizational cultures and 
routine behavior, constraining the flexibility to adopt new tasks. Furthermore, organizations 
consist of a multitude of individuals and organizational units. Thus, willingness might differ 
between units with, for example, one department being highly motivated to pursue certain 
policies, whilst others resist. In the context of urban governance, such differences might even 
be amplified, as the organizational environment also includes a multitude of organizations, 
including companies, citizen groups and lobby groups that all have some leverage on policy 
development and implementation (Stoker, 1998). In such a fragmented organizational context, 
identifying willingness needs to be sensitive to ‘who’ the group is that is willing and how it 
relates to others that might not. 
Investigating local willingness in a context of decentralization should also pay attention to the 
kind of tasks and government functions that are decentralized (e.g., Fleurke and Hulst, 2006; 
Prud’homme, 1995). Local units need to perceive tangible benefits when performing such 
tasks. These can range from financial or economic benefits (extrinsic motivation), to social 
welfare creation, or even have advantages gained from an ideological or societal value-driven 
perspective (intrinsic motivation). While energy might well be relevant for all these benefits 
(e.g., de Boer and Zuidema, 2016), energy also runs a risk of being an issue not directly 
appreciated as being urgent in a local realm. Zuidema (2016) discussed a similar problem 
regarding environmental policies in a local realm where he identified this as having a 
relatively weak profile. Some of his examples are also applicable when discussing energy. 
The benefits of renewable energy are also partly invisible and less tangible (as with global 
climate change and air pollution). Renewable energy is also facing technological uncertainty 
(Andrews-Speed, 2012) while an energy transition will require tremendous investments. 
Apart from the costs of adding renewable production capacity, also many changes are needed 
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to the many cables, wires, installations or even machinery relying on fossil fuels (e.g. cars, 
heating systems, housing, shipping, etc.). Even though recent studies have shown that 
previously high capital cost of renewable energy production have an increased decline and 
more economic potentials start to emerge (e.g., solar and wind) (Pfenninger et al., 2014), 
economic challenges thus still remain. Long-lead times and high initial investments needed 
for the planning and construction of more sustainable energy systems can be competing with 
the pursuit of short-term economic rewards (Scrase and MacKerron, 2009). In addition, 
institutional barriers in energy transition still remain with routines and regulations favoring 
existing fossil fuel based practices remaining relevant (Pinkse and Groot, 2015). So while 
renewable energy is clearly gaining a stronger profile with regards to its social and economic 
prospects, it remains realistic that renewable energy ambitions can be eclipsed by priorities 
that are easier to recognize as being economically attractive policy objectives on local 
government policy agendas (Andrews-Speed, 2012). Hence, local authorities might be 
reluctant to deal with the energy transition unless, at least, external incentives are present 
(e.g., rewards, pressure and prods). Even if there is intrinsic motivation, it is probably still 
challenging to balance sustainable energy with other policy priorities, as other motives and 
interests also compete for budget and effort within the wider urban governance arena (e.g., 
GDP growth, housing and environment). That is: even if fractions of the urban government 
and society do experience an intrinsic motivation, it is all but evident that the wider urban 
governance agenda is susceptible to sustainable energy ambitions. Therefore, these risks of 
renewable energy ambitions are crucial to take into account in empirical analysis.
Understanding ability
Ability, first of all, relates to the qualities and characteristics of the local units that have to 
perform decentralized functions. Prud’homme (1995) highlighted that local units cannot 
simply be assumed to be equipped with the technical and managerial expertise required to 
perform a decentralized task. Zuidema (2016) added to this that, next to access to sufficient 
quantity and quality of staff members, access to relevant tools and technologies (ICT based, 
computer models, monitoring tools, etc.) are also needed. Furthermore, allowing local units to 
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invest in, for example, new technologies and equipment, research and development, hiring 
consultants or attracting new staff can compensate for when abilities are constrained by poor 
access to financial resources. 
In practice, there are often important ‘economies of scale’ associated with many tasks, where 
larger (central) government units might have a greater ability in attracting competent staff, for 
investing in research or for attracting required resources to handle arising and broad ranging 
policy issues (Prud'homme, 1995; Zuidema, 2016). Hence, there are doubts as to whether 
smaller (local) units can be sufficiently equipped with equivalent abilities as central 
governments (e.g., Prud’homme, 1995; Segal, 1997). Economies of scale might be less 
relevant in this research, as case study cities in a Chinese context often have in excess of one 
million inhabitants, while the arguments in the literature on decentralization have tended to 
discuss units (much) smaller than that. Nevertheless, it is also well-documented that (large) 
cities in China do face common problems, such as inadequate technical resources, unqualified 
staff (also Gilbert et al., 2013). Hence, as Ostrom (2015) suggested, the central government 
should support local authorities to overcome potential constraints by supporting their basic 
needs, conditions and facilities so as to better engage in decentralized policy design. 
Therefore, when investigating ability, it is crucial to understand how it is influenced by 
central government support, which, in our case, implies the NEDC policy framework. 
The ability to deliver might also be constrained as a transition towards a low-carbon energy 
system involves several competences that can be highly challenging to (local) governments, 
amplifying the possible impact of economies of scale. The ongoing transition requires new 
ways of thinking, working and operating, for example: new technical designs, components 
and practices to adapt to the new socioeconomic system (Andrews-Speed, 2012). During this 
transition process, new technologies need to upscale and be embedded in space, grids and 
businesses. Thus, local authorities need to equip themselves with the technical abilities to 
tackle this challenge. However, transforming the energy system is not merely restricted to 
developing and replacing technology. Changes in social and institutional rules, like new 
policies, new relationships between different actors and various domains, and new 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
10
organizational structures between departments and within the energy industry, are also needed 
(Moss et al., 2015). Therefore, this requires an integrated approach that can link cross-sectoral 
interests, priorities, ideas and the formation of partnership with key stakeholders. Hence, 
managerial abilities are also needed, supported by, for example, professional training systems 
and collaborations with companies or civil society.
Scope of influence 
Willingness and ability should not be rigorously separated. After all, when willingness is 
strongly fragmented in urban governance, there are also practical constraints in being able to 
successfully govern. A crucial interrelationship between willingness and ability comes 
forward in what Prud’homme (1995) called ‘external effects’ and that Zuidema (2016) related 
to the ‘scope of influence’. Both are relevant in the case of energy policies; most notably as it 
involves issues that manifest on multiple spatial scales. This multi-scalar character tends to 
result in a limited local sphere of influence over such issues (Ostrom, 2015). This means that 
local authorities have no or little impact on such issues, since the “decisions of adjacent 
municipalities or higher-level authorities are also relevant” (Zuidema, 2011, p.118). To 
illustrate the point in distributed power generation, state-owned enterprises are reluctant to 
accept major adjustments to the operation of electricity networks in order to maintain their 
powerful positions in the prevailing market paradigm (Sauter and Bauknecht, 2009). Local 
new (or small) power enterprises, therefore, are, either shunted from entering the market, or 
face price competition with large state-owned companies (e.g., Xingang et al., 2012). 
Decentralization now becomes risky, since all these potential problems can undermine local 
willingness and ability. An individual local unit alone cannot solve such problems, while the 
regional, or even national, cooperation is desirable. Thus, investigating willingness and ability 
again begs for the attention of central policies and cross-jurisdictional coordination.
3. Methodology
This study follows a qualitative case study approach, choosing the New Energy 
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Demonstration City (NEDC) program as its case, which is introduced in this section. The 
program provides a context to explore local authorities’ willingness and ability in developing 
decentralized energy policies.  To better identify the specific local responses to NEDC 
program, also four cities within the NEDC were studied in detail. The case selection is 
presented in this section, as well as the process of data collection and analysis.
3.1. Introduction to case program: New Energy Demonstration City (NEDC)
The NEDC program is the most recently launched program. It operates within a broad variety 
of different city and development programs that have been introduced by different Chinese 
ministries, such as Eco-City (2003), Low Carbon Eco-City (2009) and Low-Carbon City 
(2010). Their common goal has been to improve urban development by incorporating 
ecological and environmental (e.g., energy) in policy making and implementation. Evaluation 
of these programs has illustrated that rather broad and fuzzy visions were translated 
insufficiently into policies and resulted in modest policy success on a local level (e.g., Khanna 
et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014). The NEDC program aims to establish more tangible targets, 
focused directly on the development of local projects in the field or renewables to instigate 
and support the shift a sustainable urban energy system. The development of a decentralized 
energy system and the implementation of renewables-based technologies are important foci of 
the program. 
The NEDC program was implemented by the National Energy Bureau (NEB) in 2012 (NEB, 
2012), related to the 12th Five-Year-Plan Renewable Energy Development (NDRC, 2012), 
which programmed the implementation of 100 New-Energy-Demonstration-Cities until 2015. 
Those cities were meant to become examples of good practice for other Chinese cities. Local 
authorities are expected independently to take the decisions and responsibilities for NEDC 
program implementation. However, the state assumes that decentralization will facilitate 
better local authorities’ responses to locally embedded issues, resulting in more favorable 
policy outcomes. The NEB encouraged local authorities to volunteer in the program. They 
especially targeted municipalities with high potential (e.g., natural resources) and ambitions 
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for participation. Local authorities responded well, due to their prior experiences where 
volunteering in comparable programs was incentivized by additional national funding, tax 
benefits, subsidies, program investments, and external cooperation (China low-carbon city 
construction report, 2014). The plans submitted for the selection committee had expected 
these to be customized to local circumstances, illustrating innovative strategies. However, 
previous studies for similar programs illustrated (e.g., de Jong et al., 2016) that developed 
strategies and implementation actions are often too optimistic about their expected impacts, 
they over-rate organizational capacities for developing and implementing plans, and they are 
often very unpractical.  
In 2014, 81 cities and eight industrial parks were selected and approved based on the 
following criteria: (1) by 2012 their share of renewables was more than 3% of total energy 
consumption; (2) the ratio should have risen to a minimum threshold level of 6% by 2015 
(NEB, 2012); and (3) they already showed progress in energy saving and environmental 
protection, i.e. municipal energy consumption per unit industrial value-added was below the 
provincial average (NEB, 2014). Initial audits and monitoring showed that “…most cities are 
having difficulties and low motivation in performing the NEDC program, resulting in an 
overall very slow rate of progress” (Study of capacity building of new energy demonstration 
cities, 2016, p.17). 
3.2. Case study cities
Four case study cities were selected to cover diverse urban conditions, such as geographical 
location, availability of different natural resources and energy resources, population size and 
economic performance (Fig.1). A diverse sample allows the investigation of a broad range of 
different responses to the NEDC program.
(see attached Fig. 1)
The two cities on the east coast are economically strong and well developed with active 
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markets, a strong technical workforce, rich talent pools, and advanced ideas of urban 
development (China statistical yearbook for regional economy, 2016). Due to their economic 
strengths, they were expected to be well equipped with resources and have a higher ability to 
perform. In addition, Yangzhou was specifically interesting, as it has shown increasing 
interest and ambition regarding renewable energy and already has implemented a diverse 
range of sustainable energy initiatives and projects. The selection of these two cities was 
based on the assumption that, if such economically well-performing cities are facing 
challenges regarding their ability, one might consider the challenges other cities are facing are 
even more grand.
Dunhuang is a small city in northwest China in Gansu province, which is rich in mineral 
resources, petrochemicals and electricity generation. Dunhuang is one of the richest areas in 
China for solar energy, enjoying approximately 3,258 sunshine hours per year and 75% 
sunshine percentage. Geomorphologically, the surrounding Gobi Desert provides excellent 
conditions for solar power generation, putting Dunhuang in a frontrunner position for PV and 
applications (ADB, 2014). Despite the richness in natural resources, economically, it is one of 
the least developed Chinese regions. Dunhuang represents an opportunity to investigate how 
resource rich, but economically weak localities respond to the NEDC program. Xi’an is 
located in the Guanzhong plains in northwestern China with an average economic strength, 
focusing on manufacturing industries and services. It invests in high tech industries, research 
and development activities. Xi’an, along with Chongqing and Chengdu, belong to the 
Western Triangle Economic Zone (the three cities comprised a 40% share of Western China’s 
GDP already in 2009), which is expected to be a major driver for future growth, especially in 
the high-tech industry (The China Perspective, 2017). 
3.3. Data collection
The empirical work is based on an in-depth document and policy analysis drawn from various 
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Chinese research reports.2 This analysis provided the basis for the 28 semi-structured 
interviews conducted in the four city cases between December 2015 and January 2016: 
Dunhuang (5 interviews), Xi’an (5), Yangzhou (6), and Nanjing (6). The interviewees include 
journalists, scholars, project managers of energy enterprises, and government officials from 
different levels of government and different departments related to energy projects: such as 
planning, economy and environmental protection. Six additional interviews were conducted 
with representatives from the central government, the National Renewable Energy Research 
Institute and the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing. Table 1 shows the interview 
questions. Qualitative data from the interviews were analyzed using content analysis 
techniques (Krippendorff, 2012).
(see attached Table 1)
4. Findings and discussion 
4.1. Limited willingness: a weak profile revealed
In evaluating the NEDC, Runqing (2015) pointed out the slow development of the program. 
The interviews confirmed this picture and especially the frustration regarding the expected 
external incentives and benefits: “(…) by far we have not yet received any financial 
allocation, tax benefits or rewards policies from the central government’’ (NJ03, 2016). The 
NEDC triggered and motivated local authorities and stakeholders with the promise of 
financial incentives. Prior experiences with comparable programs that were heavily 
incentivized (e.g., Low-Carbon City) amplified the expectations and the extrinsic stimulus to 
participate (BJ03, 2015). The missing external stimulus now undermines the local willingness 
of NEDC implementation. Consequently, intrinsic motivation has become dominant, which, 
in practice, was often limited to using the NEDC label merely to add to city branding to 
attract external investors and companies (BJ02, 2015). This phenomenon, in particular, 
2 China renewable energy industry development report, 2014; China low-carbon city construction 
report, 2014; and Study of the capacity building of new energy demonstration cities in China, 2016.
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happened in larger cities, such as Nanjing and Xi’an: “The energy transition itself actually 
holds little attractions for us, since it can only contribute a small proportion to local GDP” 
(NJ04, 2016). This might be due to the Chinese so-called GDP-ism, where GDP growth is the 
overriding policy goal (Table 2). This corresponds with earlier research results (Jia et al., 
2015). Under high political pressure, local authorities prioritize policy targets and measures 
that can propel economic development. Additionally, governing the energy transition is a 
long-term pursuit, which sometimes conflicts with short-term priorities, e.g., GDP 
improvement. The NEDC program, as part of this transitional aim, requires significant 
investment but “(…) has a long payback period and unstable earnings” (XA03, 2015). The 
weak profile of sustainable energy ambitions indeed undermines intrinsic motivations. 
Combined with the non-appearance of external benefits, the NEDC has become mere 
‘window dressing’ with minor impacts. This outcome also resonates with work from Gneezy 
et al. (2011) who showed that low or insufficient extrinsic incentives could lower the 
willingness and increase the risk of implementation deficiencies.
(see attached Table 2)
Compared to Xi’an and Nanjing, Dunhuang and Yangzhou showed more intrinsic motivation 
for NEDC implementation. In Dunhuang pushing for renewable energy is even a citywide 
mission, supported by considering it a key economic opportunity for the city. With Dunhuang 
thus shown the rise of renewable energy as a possible opportunity to support GDP growth, the 
other cities were different. Even in Yangzhou renewable energy was largely limited to the 
energy department. The Yangzhou energy department’s stated vision is to improve the 
livability and sustainability of the city as a result of the energy transition, and considered the 
NEDC program as a welcome opportunity to realize this vision (YZ02/03, 2016). However, 
the size of the group and enforcement power hampered their possibility to push the agenda, 
design and implement projects and, therefore, they missed the reinforcement, internal 
satisfaction and social recognition (Rode et al., 2015) for their efforts to implement the NEDC 
program. For example, the energy department of Yangzhou suggested renewables were 
integrated into old communities and new buildings, which was also drafted in its NEDC plan 
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(Table 3). However, this planned measure encountered limited support from other related 
governmental sectors, such as the housing department: “We are reluctant to shoulder the 
retrofit costs alone, which can also be an extra administration burden for us” (YZ05, 2016). 
Similarly, as respondents in the economic department stated, “sustainable energy could not 
bring us immediate economic growth, along with nothing in financial support…this issue is 
then hard to be taken seriously” (YZ01,2016). Conflicts of interests and alternative policy 
priorities constrained overall local willingness for pursuing NEDC ambitions.  
(see attached Table 3)
The cases suggest that relying on intrinsic motivation alone currently might not be sufficient 
for pushing forward urban renewable energy initiatives. Even among the participants of the 
NEDC, the role of assumed (financial) benefits dominated over intrinsic motivation. Facing 
no such benefits, only two cities show evidence for motivation, while in Yangzhou, this 
motivation is limited to merely the energy department. With these cities likely being amongst 
the more proactive cities, it is unlikely the overall picture of motivations for renewable energy 
projects is larger in the majority of Chinese cities. Hence, even when decentralized working 
can add value, the results suggest that a degree of top-down pressure does remain crucial to 
create sufficient extrinsic motivation.
4.2. Technical and managerial ability
Although all four cities’ plans are in the NEDC application phase with ambitious targets and 
measures (Table 3), all lacked ideas about how exactly to implement these plans. They not 
only have difficulties translating strategic ambitions into practical tools and projects, but also 
experience difficulties integrating energy ambitions into local sectoral plans. The respondents 
pointed out that an energy transition requires many new competences, such as cross-sectoral 
working, designing long-term policy, reorganizing governance structures, creating new 
institutions, new technological skills and substantive expertise. They all considered 
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themselves ill equipped to address these challenges, lacking ‘sufficient expertise’ (Table 2). 
Notably, the respondents noted problems of limited staff, resources, and expertise, causing 
local authorities to often struggle with program implementation. The eastern, and thus richer 
cities (i.e. Nanjing and Yangzhou), did show a stronger ability regarding, for example, talent 
attraction and funding (see Table 2). Nevertheless, even these cities considered themselves to 
be only partly equipped, at most. Nanjing and Yangzhou still reported that their managerial 
and organizational abilities were too modest to fully develop cross-sectoral and integrated 
approaches and to forge convincing and sustainable partnerships with involved stakeholders. 
In doing so, several local representatives also referred to their relative small capacity to attract 
funds and expertise, as compared with the central government; indeed suggesting economies 
of scale mattered even for these larger local units.
The western cities faced the most severe problems. A national expert indicated, “ideas and 
behavioral patterns in western cities still remain in the era of planned economy. They used to 
expect and wait until the central government tells them what and how to do. It seems very 
difficult for them to link actively local energy resources to the policymaking of urban 
development” (BJ01, 2015). For example, respondents in Xi’an perceived that they found it 
hard to find sufficient quantity and qualified expertise in the design of NEDC plan. Instead, 
policy-making relied largely on a few implementing governmental officials (XA05, 2016). 
Next to finding limited technical experts, Xi’an also complained about limited skills in 
integrated working: 
“We have not found qualified staff that can help us make plans in an integrated way, considering 
energy transition in other social aspects (e.g., environment, economy). We once tried to cooperate 
with local universities and research institutes, but mostly are focusing on technology use at a 
given renewable energy resource (e.g., solar, wind or biomass) instead of thinking in a holistic 
and comprehensive way. We do not believe that making the project successful can only rely on 
exploration by a few of us sitting in government offices” (XA01, 2016).
Severe problems were also encountered in Dunhuang. As a resource-rich, but economically 
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weak city, the municipality viewed NEDC as a city mission and an opportunity to expand its 
already limited economic development channels. Therefore, Dunhuang established a 
management office to act as the implementing agency specifically for NEDC program. 
However, its high willingness could not guarantee the take off and Dunhuang noted severe 
constraints in technical and managerial expertise. Additionally, there were no distinct policies 
in place to hire specialists and to invest in research funding for NEDC. These findings align 
with the ADB report, “Gansu Province showed strong interest in the timely implementation of 
the program in its selected cities of Dunhuang…but highlighted capacity gaps in 
implementing the program” (ADB, 2014, p.3). Clearly, with even the richer eastern cities 
being constrained, success of the NEDC also would depend on national government support 
in the form of, for example, staff, funding, training or expertise. Again, decentralization 
should not be seen in isolation from central governmental roles and responsibilities.
4.3. Scope of influence 
Finally, all four cities face serious renewable energy (RE) challenges that are beyond their 
scope of influence (Table 2). One problematic example is the RE power grid integration issue. 
Although the power sector reform in China has been ongoing for several years, the current 
power market is still deeply rooted in the planned economy and administrative 
monopolization (Kahrl et al., 2011). While the market for power generation is open to the 
private sector, the power grid is state-owned and holds a monopoly on transmission, 
distribution and supply of electricity, i.e. controlled electricity purchase and sale. The State 
Grid Corporation owns and controls 88% of the regional and inter-regional transmission lines 
in China (China’s energy system reform report, 2014) and grid feed for private companies is 
limited and subject to state control. 
Also, the central government sets energy prices. Thus, even if cities implement projects and 
increase their RE share, the possibilities for further development can be limited due to 
restricted grid access: “Local private, especially small, renewable energy companies barely 
have room to negotiate with the state-owned grid companies regarding grid integration, while 
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we municipalities do not have the right to make any reforms to the current power system” 
(NJ01, 2015). A project manager in an energy enterprise remarked that, “Energy companies 
in China now failing to connect to the grid are nearly all local private companies” (BJ05, 
2016). Hence, energy project investors and developers are gradually losing their enthusiasm 
and willingness to fulfill the project implementation: “… (the) Chinese power sector does 
need a reform” (XA02, 2016), and “Open the power market and allow the sale of electricity to 
the private sector, and formulate market-oriented energy pricing systems” (YZ04, 2016). 
Failure to integrate RE into grids further hinders an energy transition: Western Chinese cities 
are experiencing high levels of renewables curtailment. A nationwide report revealed “(…) 
there was more than 30% of wind power and solar power curtailment in Gansu Province and 
Xinjiang Autonomous Region in 2015, even more than 50% in some months” (CREO, 2016, 
p. 30). The implication here is that many power producers, such as solar panels and wind 
turbines, stop generating power even when they can, thereby resulting in huge renewable 
resources being largely wasted. This is notably problematic in Dunhuang, which produces 
excess energy due to its low self-consumption, but high RE energy production. Therefore, it is 
pinning its hope on transmitting its redundant electricity to other Chinese areas with high 
electricity demand, such as cities in the east. However, these cities prefer local fossil-fuel 
power, or their own renewable potential, rather than to purchase from trans-regional markets 
in consideration of local economic benefits and in support of their own RE companies. 
This creates additional issues that are outside of their local scope of influence: (1) for Chinese 
local governments, fossil-fuel generation is still the primary source of tax revenues and 
employment; (2) RE power has no price advantage, as China’s RE price is set by central 
government and is close to the fossil-fuel price, but it rises once REs are transmitted to other 
electricity demand regions (transmission costs are counted); and (3) Chinese central 
government still maintains guaranteed quotas for fossil-fuel electricity generation, the priority 
source of generation. Meanwhile, there are no mandatory quota regulations on regional grids 
to integrate RE electricity, leaving RE struggling to compete. “We feel anxious that our mass 
renewables production struggles to be transmitted to the outside and thus are wasted,” (DH03, 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
20
2015) was one concern voiced in Dunhuang. Clearly, a larger, and even national level, reform 
of policies on Chinese power sector would be needed to boost local willingness and ability.
5. Conclusions
In the face of failures to implement some previous national energy policies, the choice of the 
Chinese national government to experiment with more decentralized working seems both 
relevant and promising. Notably, in urban contexts where the spatial implications of 
renewable energy are both vast and easily contested, such decentralized working might be 
crucial in negotiating possible societal resistance and activating local (economic) spin-offs. 
But, while area-based and decentralized working both seem sensible, if not crucial, local 
willingness and ability are not evident. Local performance is strongly constrained by 
inadequate local resources and abilities, and meanwhile, except for the case of Dunhuang, 
renewable energy does not face much local willingness. Despite its rapid increase in 
popularity a raising financial benefits, renewable energy does not yet show itself to be a 
mainstream policy priority. Even if it does, as in the case of Dunhuang, the wider national 
institutional setting and the limited scope of local influence still frustrates a rapid take-up of 
renewable energy. Renewable energy might be gaining a much stronger profile, but our study 
suggests it is currently not yet strong enough to capture the full attention and support of local 
authorities. Thus, integrating more local policy development and implementation in the 
energy transition should not ignore the role of (inter) national policies to enable and activate 
local authorities and stakeholders in pursuing energy transition policies (also De Vries 2000; 
Prud’homme, 1995; Zuidema, 2016). 
For the NEDC, only limited national support existed. There were no supportive and external 
stimuli in place to motivate local willingness. This suggests that future success would demand 
such incentives, for example, financial resources or flexible regulatory pressure. Currently, 
the pilot projects run a serious risk of becoming mere campaign slogans. These could also ask 
for performance-monitoring mechanisms, or more binding contracts or covenants between 
central government and municipalities participating in programs, such as the NEDC. Rewards 
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and pressure, in combination with monitoring local performance, can incentivize local action 
and promote cooperation between various organizational units. 
Apart from putting pressure on willingness, the limited technical and managerial expertise 
seems even more urgent. While the literature on decentralization warns about economies of 
scale for smaller local units, the current pursuit of energy transitions puts even larger local 
units at risk. The size and complexity of such a transition, combined with novel technological 
skills, seem to be too grand for even cities of eight million inhabitants. Apart from suggesting 
some degree of national support, the situation also clearly illustrates how ill-equipped many 
current governance systems still are in the face of the physical, economic and institutional 
challenges of a significant energy transition. 
Nevertheless, some degree of central government support could alleviate the challenges. They 
can help local authorities (especially smaller/western cities like Dunhuang) through guidance, 
training and offer them expertise, ideas and experience to deal with new tasks. Moreover, 
central government can balance regional differences through its national administrative 
capacities; for example, by allocating talent resources from eastern Chinese cities to western 
cities for a period to provide much-needed professional and advanced ideas and knowledge. 
Furthermore, it is necessary for the central government to set up effective regulatory 
frameworks to drive and enable RE development and electricity market reform. Doing so 
could spur local private energy companies and related stakeholders to get involved in the 
Chinese energy transition. 
Finally, it is important to note that this research findings might be based only on the Chinese 
situation, but that they explicitly resonate with existing international research findings and 
debates on decentralization. This suggests that this research findings might well be more 
widely applicable if not simply evidence of some fundamental characteristic of 
decentralization: local willingness and ability to take over decentralized responsibilities and 
tasks can easily be constrained and lacking. As such, this research findings serve as a clear 
warning for alternative policy contexts where more decentralized working is sought after 
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within the energy transition. Technical and managerial ability, the possible weak profile of 
energy vis-à-vis other local (financial) priorities and a limited local scope of influence over 
crucial causes of existing challenges simply need to be assessed and addressed before and 
while pursuing decentralization. In the meantime, this research also confirmed that when 
celebrating the importance of local initiative and involvement in energy transitions through 
area-based working, there remains a critical need for national policies and regulations; not 
only as some issues are simply better dealt with at a higher level, but also to enable, support 
and stimulate local action and area-based solutions. After all, local willingness and ability 
cannot simply be assumed, certainly not when it comes to the NEDC.
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Fig. 1. Location of the four case studies (Source: Authors)
Note: GDP is based on the year of 2016
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Table 1
Analytical framework, translated into the guideline interviews 
Potential constraint Guiding questions
Willingness   What is the driving force of applying for the program? (intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivation) 
 How important are energy issues as compared to other local policy 
priorities (e.g., GDP growth, environment)?




 Do you consider your city has sufficient technical expertise?
 Are there funding and subsidies available to support the 
implementation of NEDC program?
 How does your city attract needed expertise from different fields?
 Are there other supportive polices in your city?
b) Managerial ability 
 Do you consider your city has sufficient managerial expertise to 
develop and implement energy plans and projects?
 Are there training systems in place?
 What instruments/tools are used to discuss and balance interests 
with stakeholders?




Overview of mapped local willingness and ability to NEDC implementation
Indicators Details Dunhuang Xi’an Nanjing Yangzhou
Extrinsic motivation dominant × √ √ √
Serious degree of intrinsic 
motivation 
√ × × √
Urban wide willingness (as 
opposed to limited to small 
group of actors / departments)
√ × × ×
Willingness
Energy transition is considered 
as a crucial policy issue, 
compared to the importance of 
GDP as policy priority
× × × ×
Technical ability
Sufficient expertise × × × ×
Special funding and subsidies × × √ √
Talent attracts policy × √ √ √
Other supportive polices (e.g., 
projects subsidies, rewards, 
legal instrument)
× √ √ √
Managerial ability
Sufficient expertise; notably 
integrated approaches and 
working across departmental 
and governmental 
organizational borders
× × × ×




Tools setting to discuss and 
balance interest among 
stakeholders
× × × ×
Scope of 
influence 
Mismatch between spatial and 
administrative scales




Key measures and targets in four case studies’ NEDC plans




Key planned measures 
Dunhuang 27%  Micro Grid project:11,640kw
 Concentrating solar power (CSP) and combined heat and 
power (CHP): 145mw
 Solar PV and wind power generation: 3000mw
 Solar hot water project: 10,000m2
 Solar house project: 14,000m2
 Electric vehicle project (EV): 430 vehicles
Xi’an 6.4%  Solar hot water and wind power generation projects 
 Solar water heater systems and solar lighting in new 
developing areas





6%  Solar PV:50mw
 Waste power generation project: 44mw
 Biomass power: annual generating capacity reaching 30 
million kwh
 Wind power: 100mw wind farm
 EV: 2 EV bus charging stands;1400sm battery charging 
stations
Yanghzou 8%  Promote solar water heater systems in existing buildings
 Integrated renewable energy (RE) in historical old towns
 Geothermal application in residential communities and 
all new public buildings
 Develop 30 integrated RE community demonstration: 
installing rooftop and wall-mounted solar water heaters, 
ground source heat pump cogeneration, solar PV, 
garbage biogas ,etc.
 ‘Smart valley’ demonstration base: RE application 
education and training bases to show major RE use 
projects
*: Nanjing municipality selects Jiangning district as the pilot area for NEDC project                                         
Source: Fieldwork; NEB (2012)
